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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last five years, Americans have adopted nearly seventy thou-
sand children from foreign countries.1 The trend of intercountry adop-
tion, “the process by which a married couple or single individual of one 
country adopts a child from another country,”2 is representative of the 
new globalized world, where families are formed and dissolved beyond 
the bounds of national borders.3 Although intercountry adoption has ena-
bled many adoptive parents to form loving families and provide caring 
living environments for countless children, intercountry adoption is not 
without its share of problems. Corruption and abuse, such as child traf-
ficking, have in many cases marred the process of intercountry adoption.4 
These impediments to safe intercountry adoption led the interna-
tional community to pass the Hague Convention on Protection of Chil-
dren and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption in 1993.5 By 
signing the Convention, countries agree to “ensure that intercountry 
adoptions are made in the best interest of the child and with respect for 
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his or her fundamental rights, and to prevent the abduction, the sale of, or 
traffic in children.”6 The Convention requires its members, who have 
signed and ratified the treaty, to follow certain protocols and procedures 
for intercountry adoptions between two countries that are members to the 
Convention. However, the Convention does not prohibit member coun-
tries from engaging in intercountry adoptions with nonmember coun-
tries.7 Thus, although the United States officially joined the Convention 
on December 12, 2007, and the Convention’s rules went into effect on 
April 1, 2008,8 the United States still allows intercountry adoptions from 
countries that are nonmembers to the Convention.9 
This Comment will examine the Convention in the context of 
intercountry adoption in the United States. Specifically, this Comment 
will focus on the effect that permitting the United States to continue 
intercountry adoption with nonmember countries has on attaining the 
Convention’s goals. This Comment will argue that to effectuate the goals 
of the Convention, the United States must encourage nonmember coun-
tries to join the Convention and must eventually cease intercountry adop-
tions with nonmember countries that refuse to join. But to promote the 
best interests of the prospective adoptive children in nonmember coun-
tries, such a cessation must be done through a long-term, structured 
withdrawal, allowing nonmember countries time to develop their adop-
tion infrastructure. 
Part II of this Comment presents a brief history of intercountry 
adoption in the United States and explains problems associated with the 
growth of intercountry adoption. Part III examines the Convention’s 
formation and its requirements, and finishes by summarizing the United 
States’ ratification of the Convention. Part IV focuses on issues related to 
countries that are nonmembers to the Convention, including the lack of 
incentives nonmember countries have to join the Convention, the imprac-
ticality of the United States discontinuing adoptions from nonmember 
countries, and the difficulties developing nations have in implementing 
the Convention. Part IV closes by examining efforts by both the interna-
tional community and the United States to encourage nonmembers to 
join the Convention. Part V proposes that the United States Department 
of State create a committee to encourage nonmember countries to join 
                                                 
 6. Id. 
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2012] Members Only 1527 
the Convention and also proposes that the United States begin a long-
term withdrawal of intercountry adoptions from nonmember countries 
that refuse to join the Convention. 
II. A HISTORY OF INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION AND THE FORMATION 
OF THE CONVENTION 
This Part begins by discussing the growth of intercountry adoptions 
within the United States and then examines problems that developed in-
ternationally as a result of the rise of intercountry adoption. 
A. The Rise of Intercountry Adoption in the United States 
In the United States, the rise of intercountry adoption began after 
World War II, when large numbers of children orphaned or abandoned 
abroad as a result of the war were adopted in America.10 The trend of 
Americans adopting foreign children continued to grow as more wars, 
natural disasters, and medical epidemics led to more children losing their 
biological parents and becoming orphans.11 Currently, the United States 
is the country that receives the largest number of children through 
intercountry adoption, almost half of all children internationally adopted 
in a given year.12 The trend of the United States adopting large numbers 
of foreign children is indicative of the larger trend in intercountry adop-
tion of wealthier countries adopting children from poorer developing na-
tions.13 
Over time, social and legal changes within the United States have 
also fueled intercountry adoption.14 Within the United States, the advent 
and increased use of contraception, the legalization of abortion, and the 
                                                 
 10. Erica Briscoe, Comment, The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-
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 14. Lindsay K. Carlberg, Note, The Agreement Between the United States and Vietnam Re-
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where Paved with Good Intentions?, 17 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 119, 126 (2007). 
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increase in single parents opting to keep their children instead of putting 
them up for adoption have led to fewer domestic infants being available 
for adoption.15 The resulting decrease in the number of American babies 
available for adoption led many parents seeking to adopt to choose 
intercountry adoption.16 This influx of parents seeking intercountry adop-
tion, coupled with a realization by “sending countries”17 that intercountry 
adoption could reduce high orphan populations, led to the increase of 
intercountry adoption in the United States.18 Generally, the increase in 
intercountry adoptions by United States citizens is mutually beneficial to 
both the United States and the various sending countries; adoptive par-
ents in the United States get a child they wish for and the poverty burden 
in the sending country is lessened by providing an orphan with a suitable 
home abroad.19 
B. Problems with and Reactions to the Growth of Intercountry Adoption 
As the number of intercountry adoptions in the United States has 
increased, so has the number of problems associated with the adoption 
process. For example, conflicting laws between the United States and 
sending countries, along with bureaucratic red tape, have made 
intercountry adoption more difficult.20 Problems obtaining visas, in-
creased bureaucracy, constantly changing laws, and an increased demand 
for adoptions have all led to corruption in the intercountry adoption pro-
cess.21 The increase in intercountry adoptions22 and the resulting corrup-
tion eventually led to the creation of a black market for babies,23 which 
was fueled by corrupt practices like kidnapping and child trafficking.24 In 
these black markets, “baby brokers” pay birth mothers or women posing 
as mothers and then place the children into the adoption market for sale 
                                                 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. For the purposes of this article, “sending countries” are those countries that have large 
numbers of their children adopted abroad through intercountry adoptions. “Receiving countries” are 
those countries that adopt a large number of children from abroad. 
 18. Carlberg, supra note 14, at 126. The number of registered intercountry adoptions steadily 
grew until 2004 when the United States registered nearly 23,000 intercountry adoptions. Statistics, 
supra note 1. Since 2004, the number of intercountry adoptions has gradually waned, with the Unit-
ed States registering 11,058 adoptions in 2010. Id. 
 19. Carlberg, supra note 14, at 125. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 129. 
 22. Id. at 125. 
 23. Briscoe, supra note 10, at 437. 
 24. Id. at 438. 
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as a commodity.25 Because of their illicit nature, the black markets lack 
any law or regulation ensuring the safety or best interests of the children 
involved.26 Following emergencies and natural disasters that lead to a 
spike in the number of orphans, vulnerable children may be abducted and 
trafficked through the intercountry adoption process.27 The Internet has 
also bolstered the intercountry-adoption black market because it ulti-
mately makes finding an adoptive child cheaper, which in turn makes 
baby trafficking more profitable for child traffickers.28 Authorities have 
an even more difficult time catching child traffickers when black market 
adoptions are conducted through the Internet.29 
Strong reactions to news stories about child trafficking and tales of 
a black market where children were being sold as commodities led to 
international efforts to create a more regulated system for international 
adoption.30 The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child in 1989.31 More recently, in 1993, the in-
ternational community, recognizing the need for a multilateral ap-
proach,32 responded to the challenges posed by intercountry adoption 
through the Convention.33 
III. THE HAGUE CONVENTION 
On May 29, 1993, the seventeenth session of The Hague Confer-
ence on Private International Law adopted the Convention.34 The Con-
vention served as a large step by the international community to legiti-
mize and attempt to regulate intercountry adoption on an international 
level.35 A watershed event in intercountry adoption, the treaty was the 
first to provide formal multinational recognition of intercountry adop-
tion.36 The Convention improved upon preceding international instru-
                                                 
 25. Worthington, supra note 11, at 562. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 563. 
 28. Carlberg, supra note 14, at 127. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Briscoe, supra note 10, at 437–38. International recognition of the problems involved with 
international adoption has led sending and receiving nations to implement stricter intercountry adop-
tion policies, which has contributed to the recent reduction in intercountry adoptions. Wechsler, 
supra note 2, at 3. 
 31. Briscoe, supra note 10, at 438. 
 32. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE 
1993 HAGUE INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION CONVENTION 62 (1994), http://www.hcch.net/upload/exp 
l33e.pdf [hereinafter Explanatory Report]. 
 33. Hague Convention, supra note 5. 
 34. Briscoe, supra note 10, at 438. 
 35. Long, supra note 4, at 635. 
 36. Id. 
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ments such as the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, and added new safeguards to the intercountry adoption process by 
regulating both sending and receiving countries.37 The Convention has 
been called “the most significant international agreement regarding the 
regulation of intercountry adoptions”38 and lauded as “the most ambi-
tious and monumental action taken . . . regarding the need to protect 
children, birth parents, and adoptive parents involved in intercountry 
adoptions from child trafficking and other abuses.”39 
A. The Framework of the Convention 
The Convention is founded on the belief that all children should be 
raised in a family environment.40 The Convention’s first priority is for 
children to stay with their biological families, but the Convention recog-
nizes that in certain cases intercountry adoption is necessary to provide 
children the family environment the Convention promotes.41 Thus, the 
Convention prefers that a child be adopted internationally when the al-
ternative is for the child to reside in an institution or orphanage within 
the child’s own country.42 The Convention’s preference for intercountry 
adoption over institutionalization marks a change from earlier approach-
es, like UNICEF’s, which prioritized in-country foster care as preferable 
to intercountry adoption.43 
The Convention sought to achieve three specific objectives. First, 
the Convention sought to establish safeguards to ensure that intercountry 
adoptions are in the best interest of the child being adopted.44 Second, the 
Convention sought to establish a system for contracting states to prevent 
child abduction and child trafficking.45 Finally, the Convention aimed to 
secure recognition of adoptions under the Convention by all member 
states.46 To achieve these objectives, the Convention established guide-
lines for adoptions between two Convention member countries.47 
                                                 
 37. See Hague Convention, supra note 5. 
 38. Laura Beth Daly, Note, To Regulate or Not to Regulate: The Need for Compliance with 
International Norms by Guatemala and Cooperation by the United States in Order to Maintain 
Intercountry Adoptions, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 620, 622 (2007). 
 39. Carlberg, supra note 14, at 129. 
 40. Long, supra note 4, at 636. 
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 42. Id. 
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 44. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. I. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. art. II. 
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First, the Convention requires that member countries establish a 
“central authority” to oversee their own intercountry adoption processes 
and enforce the Convention’s provisions domestically.48 The United 
States designated the Department of State as its central authority when it 
implemented the Convention.49 Generally, a country’s central authority 
will oversee and monitor the adoption process within its own country—
including the implementation of the Convention’s requirements through 
legislation—and also act as a coordinating body for adoptions with other 
countries.50 The central authority is also responsible for accrediting adop-
tion agencies for purposes of intercountry adoption.51 
Second, the Convention regulates the intercountry adoption process 
for sending countries that are members to the Convention. Article 4 of 
the Convention lays out the responsibilities of sending countries during 
an intercountry adoption.52 Sending countries must first determine if the 
prospective adoptive child is actually adoptable and if so, whether 
intercountry adoption is in the best interest of the child.53 In determining 
whether the child is adoptable, the sending country’s central authority 
must ensure that the birth mother of the child freely consented to giving 
the child up for adoption without being induced by payment.54 The Con-
vention also requires that authorities in the sending country consider the 
child’s own wishes when deciding whether or not to allow a potential 
intercountry adoption.55 Under the Convention, sending countries must 
also prepare a report outlining general information on the prospective 
adopted child and submit that report to the central authority of the receiv-
ing country.56 
Finally, the Convention establishes requirements for receiving 
countries.57 A receiving country’s central authority must determine the 
eligibility and suitability of potential adoptive parents, ensure that poten-
tial adoptive parents receive necessary counseling, and determine that the 
                                                 
 48. Id. art. VI. 
 49. Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Intercountry Adoption: Our Role, 
http://adoption.state.gov/about_us/role.php (last visited May 14, 2012). 
 50. Briscoe, supra note 10, at 442. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. IV. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. XVI. The report on the potential adoptee must in-
clude “information about his or her identity, adoptability, background, social environment, family 
history, medical history including that of the child’s family and any special needs of the child.” Id. 
 57. Id. art. V. 
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child can legally enter and live in the receiving country.58 Just as the 
sending country must report information concerning the adoptive child, 
the receiving country must prepare and transmit a report to the sending 
country’s central authority detailing the potential adoptive parents.59 
By signing the Convention, a country indicates its intention to 
eventually become a member of the treaty, but does not obligate itself to 
ratify the treaty.60 Thus, a country can accede to the Convention, instead 
of ratifying it, thereby affirming its commitment to the Convention’s 
goals without binding itself to the Convention’s terms.61 Countries that 
choose to sign but not ratify the Convention remain nonmembers without 
any obligations under the Convention.62 Thus, to ensure full compliance 
with the Convention, it is critical that nonmember countries not only sign 
the Convention, but also ratify it so that they are held to the heightened 
standards required of member countries. 
B. The United States’ Response to the Convention 
After participating in the seventeenth session of the Hague Confer-
ence on Private International Law,63 the United States manifested its in-
tent to become a party to the Convention by signing the Convention in 
March of 1994.64 The United States then began drafting legislation be-
tween 1994 and 1998 to implement the Convention.65 These efforts even-
tually led to Congress enacting the Intercountry Adoption Act (IAA) in 
2000.66 The IAA established the Department of State as the central au-
thority within the United States and required that any person or group 
wishing to provide international adoption services be accredited.67 The 
IAA also set out provisions for enforcing the Convention and provided 
that the Convention and the IAA would preempt any inconsistent state 
                                                 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. art. XV. The report must contain “information about their identity, eligibility and suita-
bility to adopt, background, family and medical history, social environment, reasons for adoption, 
ability to undertake an intercountry adoption, as well as characteristics of the children for whom they 
would be qualified to care.” Id. 
 60. Kimball, supra note 7, at 568–69. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 572. 
 63. Explanatory Report, supra note 32, at 4. 
 64. Kate O’Keefe, Note, The Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000: The United States’ Ratifica-
tion of the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children, and its Meager Effect on International 
Adoption, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1611, 1614 (2007). 
 65. Estin, supra note 3, at 81. 
 66. Id. at 83. 
 67. Carlberg, supra note 14, at 138. 
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laws.68 After passing the IAA, the United States eventually ratified the 
Convention in December 2007, and the Convention came into effect in 
the United States on April 1, 2008.69 
Notably, the IAA does not prohibit families in the United States 
from adopting children from countries that are nonmembers to the Con-
vention.70  Any country that ratifies the Convention has a legal obligation 
to incorporate the Convention’s terms into its domestic and international 
law.71 Because the Convention does not prohibit adoption from non-
member countries, however, the United States’ policy of continuing 
adoptions from nonmember countries is legal.72 
IV. U.S. RELATIONS WITH NONMEMBER COUNTRIES UNDER 
THE CONVENTION 
While the United States is now a member to the Convention, the 
United States continues to adopt children from countries that are non-
members of the Convention.73 Although the Convention regulates adop-
tions that take place between member countries that have mutually rati-
fied the Convention,74 it does not specify how member countries should 
interact with nonmember countries.75 Thus, the Convention does not ex-
pressly prohibit adoptions between member countries and nonmember 
countries.76 Member countries therefore have the freedom to establish 
their own intercountry adoption laws to affect their public policy goals 
beyond the standards required by the Convention.77 This freedom allows 
member countries to deal with intercountry adoptions from nonmember 
countries several ways.78 One option is for member states to ban adop-
tions from nonmember countries in an effort to ensure that the Conven-
tion’s goals are met.79 Another option, and the one followed by the Unit-
ed States, is to engage in intercountry adoptions with fellow member 
                                                 
 68. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000, CHILD 
WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/federal/ 
index.cfm?event=federalLegislation.viewLegis&id=51 (last visited May 14, 2012). 
 69. Estin, supra note 3, at 84. 
 70. Schmit, supra note 9, at 377. 
 71. Carlberg, supra note 14, at 130. 
 72. See generally Hague Convention, supra note 5. 
 73. Statistics, supra note 1.. 
 74. Long, supra note 4, at 635. 
 75. Briscoe, supra note 10, at 451. 
 76. Long supra note 4, at 640. 
 77. Andrew C. Brown, Comment, International Adoption Law: A Comparative Analysis, 43 
INT’L LAW. 1337, 1344–45 (2009). 
 78. Briscoe, supra note 10, at 451. 
 79. Long, supra note 4, at 640. 
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countries under the Convention, but to also allow intercountry adoptions 
from countries that are nonmembers to the convention.80 
Section A of this Part examines the high cost of implementing the 
Convention and the disincentives for nonmember countries to join the 
Convention. Section B explains why abruptly discontinuing adoptions 
with nonmember countries is not a viable option for the United States. 
Section C examines the practical difficulties developing nations have in 
unilaterally implementing the Convention requirements and discusses 
whether joining the Convention is worth enduring these difficulties. Sec-
tion D explores efforts by both the Hague Conference and the United 
States to encourage nonmember countries to join the Convention. 
A. The Disincentives to Join the Convention 
The high cost of implementing Convention requirements and the 
United States’ continued adoption of children from nonmember countries 
create a disincentive for nonmember countries to join the Convention. 
No incentive exists for nonmember sending countries to substantially 
change their lucrative adoption systems to more regulated, costlier sys-
tems that would meet Convention standards.81 Because the economic 
cost of implementing a system that conforms to the Convention’s stand-
ards deters nonmember sending countries from joining the Convention, 82 
and because the Convention does not prohibit adoptions between mem-
ber and nonmember countries, adoptions between member and nonmem-
ber countries will continue even if nonmember countries do not ratify the 
Convention.83 By effectively ensuring that adoptions continue between 
countries that are not parties to the Convention, the Convention’s goals 
are undermined.84 
The United States inhibits the goal of ending abuses within the 
intercountry adoption system on a global scale by continuing to adopt 
children from nonmember countries. To achieve the Convention’s goal 
of ending abuses within the intercountry adoption system, the Conven-
tion must be signed and ratified by a majority of sending countries.85 As 
long as the United States continues to adopt children from nonmember 
countries, nonmember countries have no incentive to spend valuable re-
                                                 
 80. See 42 U.S.C. §14921 (2000). 
 81. Carlberg, supra note 14, at 136. 
 82. Kimball, supra note 7, at 564. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Carlberg, supra note 14, at 146. See generally Hague Convention, supra note 5. 
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sources in efforts to join the Convention.86 Thus, the United States’ con-
tinued adoption of children from nonmember sending countries ultimate-
ly undermines the principles and provisions of the Convention.87  
This disincentive to join the Convention is exacerbated by the fact 
that if the nonmember country joins the Convention, it will not be al-
lowed to continue adoptions with the United States or other member 
countries until it fully complies with all of the Convention’s standards.88 
The threat of member countries discontinuing intercountry adoptions 
because of noncompliance with the Convention’s regulations will cause 
nonmember countries that are considering joining the Convention to de-
lay efforts at compliance with the Convention, perhaps indefinitely.89 
Thus, instead of joining the Convention, nonmember countries are more 
likely to draft their own treaties or provisions governing their adoption 
processes.90   
B. The Problem with the United States Banning Adoptions from 
Nonmember Countries 
Although the United States must cease intercountry adoptions with 
nonmember countries to fully effectuate the goals of the Convention and 
to create an incentive for nonmember countries to join the Convention, 
abruptly ceasing adoptions from nonmember countries would lead to in-
creased institutionalization and homelessness of potential adoptees.91 
Because the Convention prefers intercountry adoption over institutionali-
zation,92 abruptly banning intercountry adoption from nonmember coun-
tries and causing more children to be institutionalized runs contrary to 
the Convention’s goals.93 UNICEF concluded that when children are 
placed in institutions unnecessarily or for too long, they receive less 
stimulation and individual attention, which they require to grow to their 
full potential.94 These institutionalized children are subject to physical, 
mental, and emotional challenges.95 Studies have found that children who 
spent significant periods of time in institutional care suffer more psycho-
                                                 
 86. Kimball, supra note 7, at 583. 
 87. Brown, supra note 77, at 1364. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See generally Hague Convention, supra note 5, pmbl. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See id. 
 94. Worthington, supra note 11, at 570. 
 95. Id. at 571. 
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logical and physical problems than children adopted during infancy.96 
Those psychological and physical disabilities may make the children 
more difficult to parent later in life if they are ever adopted.97 The poten-
tial outcome of a complete ban on adoption from nonmember coun-
tries—increased homelessness and institutionalization—could detrimen-
tally affect children and families that the Convention was designed to 
protect.98 
The threat of member countries discontinuing adoptions from 
member countries that have not sufficiently implemented the Conven-
tion’s requirements is real. From 2006 to 2008, Americans adopted over 
4,000 children per year from Guatemala.99 This high rate of adoption was 
largely due to the lack of regulation of intercountry adoptions within 
Guatemala.100 Guatemala ratified the Convention in May of 2007 and the 
Convention entered into force in December of 2007.101 Since Guatemala 
and the United States have both become parties to the Convention, adop-
tions to the United States from Guatemala have dropped to just 754 in 
2009 and to only 50 in 2010.102 Currently, the United States has ceased 
adoptions from Guatemala because Guatemala has failed to “create a 
Convention-compliant adoption process, and as a result, Guatemala can-
not meet its Convention obligations.”103 The risk of losing an existing 
adoption relationship with a member country due to insufficient imple-
mentation of Convention standards is enough to keep nonmember coun-
tries from joining the Convention and jeopardizing their current stream 
of adoptions.104 
By abruptly discontinuing intercountry adoptions with sending 
countries, the United States adversely affects the children in those coun-
                                                 
 96. Briscoe, supra note 10, at 453. 
 97. Long, supra note 4, at 657–58. 
 98. Worthington, supra note 11, at 582. 
 99. Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Guatemala Country Information, 
INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION, http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/country_specific_info 
.php?country-select=guatemala (last updated Nov. 2009) [hereinafter Guatemala Info]. 
 100. Daly, supra note 38, at 624. 
 101. Long, supra note 4, at 650. 
 102. Guatemala Info, supra note 99. Though the United States has largely halted adoptions 
with Guatemala, certain pending cases were grandfathered in after the ban, which accounts for the 
continuing, although limited, number of adoptions from Guatemala after the ban. Bureau of Consular 
Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of Children’s Issues Trip to Guatemala, INTERCOUNTRY 
ADOPTION (Feb. 3 2011), http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/country_specific_alerts_ 
notices.php?alert_notice_type=notices&alert_notice_file=guatemala_3. 
 103. Guatemala Info, supra note 99. 
 104. See Schmit, supra note 9, at 388. In 2010, four of the top five countries (Ethiopia, Russia, 
South Korea, and Ukraine) from which the United States received children through intercountry 
adoptions were nonmembers to the Convention. Statistics, supra note 1. 
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tries. In December 2002, the United States ceased adoptions with Cam-
bodia because of suspicions of child trafficking.105 Some regarded the 
United States’ measure as “the equivalent of condemning children with-
out families to institutional life.”106 Similarly, after adoptions ceased be-
tween the United States and Guatemala, some lamented the fact that 
thousands of potential adoptees were prevented from joining adoptive 
homes in the United States because of political and legislative reasons107 
and were instead destined to a life in a Guatemalan orphanage or an un-
suitable life in the countryside where children’s survival rates are signifi-
cantly lower.108 
When the United States, the world’s number one recipient of 
intercountry adoptions,109 ceases adoptions from another country, it will 
greatly affect the number of children adopted from that country. Many of 
the top ten nations from which the United States has received adoptees—
Russia, Kazakhstan, South Korea, the Ukraine, and Ethiopia—are non-
members to the Convention.110 If the United States abruptly discontinued 
adoptions from any of these countries, these countries would likely have 
more children to take care of because domestic families would not adopt 
all of the children. 
Some countries, such as South Korea, restricted intercountry adop-
tions and discovered that domestic adoption did not increase enough to 
offset the loss of international adoptions.111 There are now roughly 
17,000 children living in public orphanages in South Korea.112 Although 
it was a unilateral decision by a nonmember country to limit intercountry 
adoptions and not a decision by the receiving country to halt adoptions, 
South Korea’s actions show the dangers of abruptly stopping 
intercountry adoption. The limited demand for domestic adoptions will 
likely result in unadopted children living in orphanages or on the street 
because many sending countries’ social welfare systems do not have the 
resources to handle these children domestically.113 And children living on 
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the street are at risk of becoming victims of child trafficking,114 which is 
antithetical to the Convention’s goals.115 
Romania, motivated by its acceptance into the European Union be-
ing conditioned on reform of its adoption system, banned intercountry 
adoption in 2001.116 As a result, intercountry adoptions to the United 
States dropped from 1119 children in 2000 to just 5 children in 2009.117 
Since the ban, children have been forced to live with destitute families 
and placed in orphanages.118 UNICEF statistics from 2006 estimated that 
there were 77,866 abandoned children in private or public care in Roma-
nia.119 Of those, roughly a third ended up in institutions, while less than 
five hundred were placed in an adoption system.120 Because Romania’s 
social welfare system was insufficient to care for the influx of abandoned 
children, and domestic adoption was not enough to compensate for the 
ban on intercountry adoptions, many children were forced to live on the 
streets of Romania.121 The United States recognized that Romania’s out-
right ban on intercountry adoptions, while intended to help protect the 
children and families involved, ultimately ended up doing greater harm 
to the children than good.122 
C. Difficulties Implementing the Convention 
Many developing nonmember sending countries willing to join the 
Convention will be unable to implement all the Convention’s require-
ments on their own because of financial, social, and political limitations. 
“Implementation efforts generate bureaucratic, political, and financial 
obstacles which states are forced to overcome in order to become signa-
tories to the Hague Convention.”123 The Convention places formidable 
burdens on sending countries. Sending countries are required to “regulate 
the process of matching children with adoptive parents, protect the rights 
of the children and their biological parents, investigate ways for the chil-
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dren to remain in their birth country, and combat illegal adoption practic-
es.”124 
Nonmember sending countries’ limited financial resources and po-
litical instabilities often make it difficult for them to implement the Con-
vention’s many provisions.125 The dearth of money, political support, and 
practical expertise in many countries makes implementation in develop-
ing nations at best arduous and at worst impossible.126 Developing coun-
tries’ inability to handle the administrative burdens associated with im-
plementing the Convention is problematic because these countries usual-
ly have the most orphans and the greatest amount of corruption in their 
adoption processes,127 making them hotbeds for the problems in the 
intercountry adoption process that the Convention sought to address. In 
other words, the countries in most need of the Convention are the coun-
tries least able to implement it. These developing countries, which re-
ceive criticism for child trafficking, are at the same time unable to suc-
cessfully implement the Convention’s standards that address this prob-
lem.128 
For instance, after Guatemala acceded to the Convention in No-
vember of 2002, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and Great 
Britain, all Convention members, objected and discontinued intercountry 
adoptions with Guatemala because its adoption practices were incon-
sistent with the Convention’s requirements.129 At the time of accession, 
Guatemala lacked the resources and adoption infrastructure to comply 
with and join the Convention.130 Nevertheless, Guatemala affirmed its 
commitment to the Convention’s goals by acceding to the Convention 
only to have prominent member countries discontinue intercountry adop-
tions with Guatemala.131 Developing nonmember countries with the de-
sire but not the means to implement the Convention will be loath to ac-
cede to the Convention for fear that its intercountry adoptions will be 
stopped like Guatemala’s. But the Convention’s effectiveness is contin-
gent on getting countries—especially developing countries with large 
numbers of orphans and high levels of corruption in their adoption pro-
cesses—to become parties to the Convention. Therefore, member coun-
tries should encourage developing nations to accede to the Convention, 
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and should offer assistance in implementing the Convention’s require-
ments. 
In addition to financial barriers complicating implementation, im-
plementation also imposes social costs for children in the sending coun-
tries. There are legitimate concerns that if a government begins to im-
plement the Convention’s standards through the legislative process, po-
tential adoptees in need of homes would have to wait prolonged periods 
of time to be adopted.132 Because of this, some have argued that less reg-
ulation in the intercountry adoption process makes it easier to provide 
children with caring adoptive homes in a shorter period of time.133 This 
view recognizes the short-term detrimental effects on children when 
countries try to comply with the Convention and the likelihood that 
“many of the children who may have previously been adopted by for-
eigners will not be adopted domestically and, instead, will be without a 
permanent home and family.”134 Although this view correctly emphasiz-
es the social costs Convention implementation can have on children, it 
ignores the adverse effects, such as child trafficking, that under-
regulation has on many children. 
Despite the potential for short-term social costs to children, the 
Convention’s regulations can serve children’s interests in the long term if 
implemented in more countries. For example, the Convention requires 
that both sending and receiving nations have a designated central authori-
ty to oversee the adoption process by communicating with the other 
countries involved, ensuring that the adoption is truly in the best interest 
of the child, and establishing the legitimacy of the adoption by proving 
informed consent of the parents and the children where applicable.135 
This requirement operates as a bulwark against child-trafficking and oth-
er abuses caused by under-regulation. 
D. Past Efforts to Encourage Compliance 
The Hague Conference and the United States have both tried to en-
courage nonmember countries to comply with Convention standards and 
to join the Convention. In 2000, the Hague Conference’s secretariat, the 
Permanent Bureau, formed a “Special Commission” to review the practi-
cal operation of the Convention.136 The Special Commission unanimous-
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ly recommended that member countries apply Convention principles to 
nonmember countries and encourage nonmember countries to join the 
Convention.137 Later Commissions that reviewed the practical operation 
of the Convention again in 2005138 and in 2010 reiterated this recom-
mendation.139 Thus, while the text of the Convention is silent on how 
member countries should deal with intercountry adoptions from non-
member countries,140 the Hague Conference’s Special Commissions have 
stated that member countries must engage with nonmember countries to 
encourage them to join the Convention.141 
To assist nonmember nations in implementing and applying Con-
vention standards, the Hague Conference’s Permanent Bureau developed 
a Guide to Good Practice aimed “at policy makers involved in short-term 
and long-term planning to implement the Convention in their country.”142 
This guide is meant to assist nonmember nations seeking to join the 
Convention to implement the Convention at the local, national, and in-
ternational level.143 “The Guide is intended to be a practical and hands on 
guide—one that would give practical advice and authentic examples 
from the current national practices to assist countries to prepare for im-
plementation and to actually perform their obligations and procedures 
after ratification or accession.”144 
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Following the Guide to Good Practice with a more hands-on ap-
proach, the Permanent Bureau established the Intercountry Adoption 
Technical Assistance Programme (ICATAP), which provides assistance 
directly to governments of nonmember countries that are going to ratify 
or accede to the Convention, or those countries that are having difficul-
ties implementing the Convention.145 The ICATAP works to identify 
weaknesses or needs in a particular country seeking to join the Conven-
tion, and then considers what resources the Hague Conference can offer 
in terms of training and technical assistance.146 The United States has 
supported ICATAP with grants to help with running costs.147 The Special 
Commission has acknowledged the value of ICATAP and the technical 
assistance it has provided to countries such as Nepal in their efforts to 
join the Convention.148 But the limited resources available to the Perma-
nent Bureau bind the ICATAP, and the Special Commission has encour-
aged member countries to make financial or in-kind contributions to 
maintain the program.149 Because of the limited resources available to 
ICATAP, there is a need for member states, such as the United States, to 
either continue to fund the ICATAP or unilaterally assist developing na-
tions seeking to implement the Convention. 
Like the Hague Conference, the United States has encouraged send-
ing countries to conform to the Convention. Although these efforts 
demonstrate the United States’ interest in other countries joining and im-
plementing standards that conform to the Convention, the ineffective 
results demonstrate that the United States needs to alter its approach to 
encouraging other states’ compliance with the Convention. For example, 
before Guatemala became a member to the Convention, the U.S. State 
Department regularly issued notices concerning intercountry adoptions 
with Guatemala and expressed hope that the Guatemalan government 
would pass legislation implementing the Convention.150 Further, gov-
ernment officials visited Guatemala to push the Guatemalan government 
to implement the Convention.151 Although Guatemala ultimately ratified 
the Convention,152 it did so before it instituted a Convention-compliant 
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adoption process, forcing the United States, as a Convention member, to 
discontinue intercountry adoptions with Guatemala.153 
The United States has also used bilateral treaties to encourage send-
ing nations to comply with Convention standards. The Convention de-
sired to take “into account the principles set forth in international instru-
ments, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, of 20 November 1989,”154 which required the parties to “ensure 
that the best interests of the child shall be the paramount considera-
tion”155 and to “take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral 
measures to prevent the abduction, the sale of or traffic in children for 
any purpose or in any form.”156 Although the Convention does not ex-
plicitly encourage bilateral treaties between member countries and non-
member countries, the Convention’s Special Commission has recognized 
such treaties as long as they do not supplant the Convention.157 
Although bilateral treaties between countries encouraging safe 
intercountry adoption may be a means to encourage nonmember coun-
tries to comply with the Convention’s safeguards, they should not be a 
substitute for joining the Convention. Prior to joining the Convention, the 
United States entered into a bilateral agreement with Vietnam, a non-
member country, to ensure safe adoptions between the two countries.158 
Recognizing Vietnam’s history of lax intercountry adoption regula-
tions159 and the need to shore up Vietnam’s adoption process, the United 
States and Vietnam entered into a bilateral treaty in June of 2005 to en-
courage Vietnam to develop safeguards.160 But after this bilateral agree-
ment expired in October 2008, evidence of fraud and a lack of sufficient 
legal safeguards in Vietnam’s adoption system led the United States and 
Vietnam to jointly suspended adoptions from Vietnam until a new bilat-
eral agreement is reached or until Vietnam joins the Convention.161 
Both countries recognize that intercountry adoptions from Vietnam 
to the United States will not resume until Vietnam undertakes major re-
forms in its child welfare system to prioritize the best interests of chil-
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dren and protect participating parties’ fundamental rights.162 Although 
Vietnam has approved legislation to improve its intercountry adoption 
process and intends to become a party to the Convention, it has not an-
nounced a date for joining the Convention.163  Thus, while the bilateral 
treaty between the United States and Vietnam signified efforts by the 
United States to get a nonmember country to conform to the Conven-
tion’s standards, ultimately bilateral treaties are best used as a means to 
eventually get countries to conform with and join the Convention, not as 
a substitute for the Convention. 
Member countries must encourage nonmember countries to imple-
ment Convention guidelines and eventually join the Convention because 
the Convention provides a uniform international and intergovernmental 
set of minimum standards for member countries to adhere to in their in-
ternational adoption processes.164 Adhering to the Convention’s stand-
ards will further the goal of stopping child trafficking across international 
borders.165 Additionally, the Convention mandates the recognition of 
adoptions by operation of law for any adoption in compliance with its 
regulations, easing the recognition of adoptions performed in other coun-
tries.166 Thus, it is important for the United States to further the goals of 
the Convention by encouraging other nonmember countries to join the 
Convention. 
V. PROPOSAL 
The Convention’s goals of providing a safer and more regulated 
process for people seeking to adopt and children involved in intercountry 
adoption can only be met if countries participating in intercountry adop-
tion join the Convention. Yet nonmember sending countries are unlikely 
to join the Convention when member countries, such as the United 
States, continue to adopt from them despite their failure to join the Con-
vention. Additionally, many nonmember sending countries are develop-
ing countries without the necessary resources to implement the Conven-
tion’s standards. The Convention imposes burdens on member countries 
without providing sufficient help to countries trying to implement the 
Convention’s regulations on a domestic level.167 Therefore, in accord 
with the principles of the Convention, the United States must implement 
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a long-term policy to encourage and help nonmember countries to join 
the Convention, while phasing out adoptions from countries that refuse 
to join the Convention. 
The United States could use its own central authority, the Depart-
ment of State, to form a committee similar to the ICATAP to work with 
nonmember countries that are willing but unable to implement an adop-
tion framework that complies with the Convention’s requirements. The 
United States has the resources and experience to aid sending countries 
in developing effective laws, regulations, and adoption systems that 
comply with the Convention’s requirements.168 Additionally, the United 
States receives a large number of intercountry adoptions from nonmem-
ber sending countries169 and could use its familiarity with the adoption 
processes of these states to better help them implement the Convention’s 
requirements. For nonmember countries successfully using the Hague 
Conference’s Guide to Good Practice to comply with the Convention’s 
requirements, the State Department’s committee could act as a supple-
mentary resource for help and instruction. 
Helping nonmember countries with limited adoption infrastructure 
implement the Convention’s requirements may take a long period of 
time. But by working together with the sending nonmember country 
through the long implementation process, the committee could help low-
er the risk of a nonmember country prematurely ratifying the Convention 
before it establishes an adoption system that complies with the Conven-
tion, thereby ensuring that nonmembers do not inadvertently isolate 
themselves from intercountry adoptions with other member nations as 
Guatemala did. 
This long-term approach coincides with the Permanent Bureau’s 
stance on progressive implementation, which recognizes that at the out-
set, some countries with limited economic resources can “only fulfill 
their Convention obligations at a basic level.”170 The State Department’s 
committee could work with willing nonmember countries individually to 
assess their intercountry adoption programs and determine what 
measures need to be taken to conform with the Convention. The commit-
tee and the nonmember country could then cooperate to establish an in-
dividualized plan to implement the Convention, and they could agree on 
a challenging but realistic timeline for completion. By assessing each 
nonmember country individually, the committee will be able to better 
evaluate the needs of each country and to better craft a workable, realis-
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tic plan to bring each country into accord with the Convention. Once the 
nonmember country successfully implemented and ratified the Conven-
tion, the United States could deal with it as a fellow Convention mem-
ber.171 By aiding nonmember sending countries in their efforts to join the 
Convention and thereby enlarging the number of member countries, the 
United States would strengthen the Convention and ultimately make 
intercountry adoption safer for more children and parents throughout the 
world, in accordance with its commitment under the Convention. 
Although forming an American committee to assist other nonmem-
ber countries in implementing the Convention would likely be more ex-
pensive than continuing to fund the ICATAP, the committee model is 
more advantageous to the United States. Under the committee model, 
any money and resources spent by the committee would be at the discre-
tion of the United States alone. Conversely, any funding given to the 
ICATAP would be subject to expenditure by the Permanent Bureau of 
the Hague Conference.172 Thus, the committee model offers the United 
States greater freedom in how it chooses to use its resources. This free-
dom would allow the committee to spend its resources on nonmember 
countries with established intercountry adoption ties to the United States, 
such as Ethiopia, or to help Guatemala get its adoption infrastructure in 
line with the Convention’s requirements. 
To ensure that nonmember countries have ample incentive to work 
towards joining the Convention, the Department of State’s committee 
could work with nonmember countries to phase out intercountry adop-
tions. Abruptly discontinuing intercountry adoptions with nonmember 
countries would lead to increased institutionalization and homelessness, 
results antithetical to the Convention’s goal of ensuring the best interests 
of the children. To avoid these results, the United States could institute a 
withdrawal of intercountry adoptions from nonmember countries, spread 
out over time. The Department of State’s committee could work with the 
nonmember countries to negotiate the withdrawal, taking into account 
the number of children affected, the ability of the nonmember country to 
care for the increase in domestic orphans, and the status of pending cas-
es. By working together with the nonmember country, the United States 
could set up an effective plan to discontinue intercountry adoptions over 
a period of time deemed reasonable by the Department of State’s com-
mittee and avoid the overnight spike in domestic orphans that often 
overwhelms domestic infrastructure when receiving countries discontin-
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ue adoptions. Ideally, the sending countries would join the Convention in 
response to the United States’ plan to eventually discontinue intercountry 
adoptions. Even if the nonmember countries choose not to join the Con-
vention and eventually lose the opportunity to place children with fami-
lies in the United States, the State Department’s committee and the non-
member countries could work together during the withdrawal period to 
develop strategies, such as modifying the nonmember country’s domestic 
infrastructures, to accommodate the increased burden of more domestic 
orphans. Although the limited resources of sending nations would still 
make providing sufficient homes for these children difficult, the long-
term withdrawal would allow for a smoother and more prepared transi-
tion to effectively deal with the increase in domestic orphans than would 
an abrupt cessation of adoptions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The United States has demonstrated its desire to safeguard the pro-
cess of intercountry adoption by ratifying the Convention. The Conven-
tion’s goal of curbing child trafficking through a more regulated 
intercountry adoption process is a worthy goal for all nations to strive 
for. Although the Convention does not bar adoptions between member 
countries and nonmember countries, by continuing to adopt children 
from nonmember countries, the United States takes away any incentive 
for nonmember countries to commit to the goals of the Convention by 
becoming members. Yet a wholesale cessation of adoptions from these 
countries would cause an increase in child institutionalization and home-
lessness, neither of which are in the best interests of the children. Thus, it 
is necessary for the United States to implement a long-term policy to aid 
and encourage nonmember countries in their efforts to join the Conven-
tion, while slowly eliminating intercountry adoptions from countries that 
refuse to join the Convention. 
 
